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MEDICAL DATA PRIVACY: AUTOMATED INTERFERENCE
WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION

Whatever, in connection with my professional practice or not in
connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought
not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that
all such should be kept secret.
-Hippocratic Oath.'
Someday in the future, when a traveller falls ill far from home,
a local doctor may be able to input the patient's identification number into a desktop computer terminal and retrieve his medical history and drug reaction from a central data bank.2
In this era of corresponding population and medical information

increases,3 computer technology promises much needed assistance. Application of this technology to medical recordkeeping seems to be
the inevitable solution to the strain that increased population, medical

information and new patterns of residential mobility place on such
recordkeeping. While the medical databank may solve some of those

problems, it can simultaneously pose a great threat to the privacy of
medical information. Identifiable medical information regarding diag-

nosis and treatment is sensitive and private, and as such it should not
be disclosed without the patient's consent.4 Yet, in the past this con1. E. HAYT, L. HAYT & A. GROESHAL, LAW oF HOSPITAL, PHYSICIAN
1057 (3d ed. 1972) ; see note 3 infra.
2. Miller, A Nation of Datamaniacs,2 PRISM 18, 19 (June 1974).
3.

AND PATIENT

1 JOINT TASK GROUP OF THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE COUNTY OF ERIE,

MEDICAL PRIVACY AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY

70-74 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MED-

ICAL PIVACY].

4. This is recognized in medical ethics: "A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may
observe in the character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or unless it
becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or the community."
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS No. 9 (1957).

This recognition

has been bolstered by the AMA's concern over medical data privacy: "The American
Medical Association's Council on Medical Service has in recent years expressed concern
about protecting the privacy of the medical record and has laid down guidelines embodying the confidential nature of the physician/patient relationship." Rumsey, The Patient's Trust Must Be Protected, 2 PRsM 23, 23 (June 1974). In Hammonds v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Ohio 1965), the court stated a rationale
underlying the policy of confidentiality in medical information:
To foster the best interest of the patient and to insure a climate most favorable
to a complete recovery, men of medicine have urged their patients be totally
frank in their discussions with their physicians. To encourage the desired candor, men of law have formulated a strong policy of confidentiality to assure
patients that only they themselves may unlock the doctor's silence in regard
to those private disclosures.
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fidentiality has not always been respected.5 Indeed, since such information is valuable," efforts to gain access to it may be expected to increase as the use of computer systems to store such information becomes
7
more frequent.
As evidenced by the Hippocratic Oath,8 the confidentiality of information imparted in the course of the physician-patient relationship
has always been one of the cornerstones of medical ethics. The importance of preserving the patient's confidences has been recognized over
the years and incorporated in the present day ethical obligations of
the physician.9 Such ethical obligations may be seen as promoting a
policy of protecting the patient's privacy through the preservation of
confidentiality. This policy is also promoted by two statutory vehicles.
First, the majority of states have given the patient a testimonial privilege with respect to medical information.' 0 The patient has a right,
which he must elect to exercise, to have otherwise relevant and competent evidence excluded, provided that his evidence meets certain
5. Consider the following episode, related by a practicing physician:
My recognition of the need to protect the confidentiality of medical records
probably stems from a day 37 years ago when I saw a chief medical record
librarian at the Cleveland Clinic chase someone out of her record room. The
individual so speedily dispatched was an insurance company representative
seeking access to a medical record without authorization.
Rumsey, supra note 4, at 23. Consider also the situation in Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d
191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958), in which a physician felt compelled to write a letter to the
parents of his former patient's fiancee urging that the marriage not take place. In the
course of the letter the physician referred to his former patient as a "schizophrenic."
6. Given the datamania in our society, information about people is valuable,
especially if it is derogatory. Credit grantors, employers, detective agencies,
insurance companies, political operators, and governmental investigators will
pay for it or, on occasion, steal it.
Miller, supra note 2, at 57.
7. See A. R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND
DOSSIERS 43-47 (1971). The prospect of gaining access to a large store of concentrated
information may prompt greater efforts to gain such access through bribery or through
information sharing on a "buddy system."
Even if we assume that the cost of securing access to computerized "dirt" is
higher than the cost of dredging out the dirt in a more traditional form of
record, the centralized quality and compactness of a computerized dossier
creates an incentive to invade it because the payoff for doing so successfully
may be sufficiently large that the cost per unit of computerized "dirt" actually
will prove to be lower than the cost per unit of uncomputerized "dirt."
A. R. Miller, The Right of Privacy: Data Banks and Dossiers, in PRIVACY IN A FREE
SocmTY 72, 77 (1974).

8. See note 1 supra.
9. See note 4 supra.

10. The testimonial privilege is accorded the patient in at least 32 states. E. HAYT,
L. HAYT & A. GROEsHAL, supra note 1; see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4504(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1971).
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statutory requirements.1 Such an exclusion of evidence indicates a
willingness on the part of the law to subordinate the goal of ascertaining truth to the goal of preserving the confidentiality of the physicianpatient relationship. Second, in addition to ethical and evidentiary
recognitions of the importance of maintaining medical confidences,
several states recognize that the unauthorized disclosure of medical
information is an adequate legal ground for revocation of a physician's
license.' 2 However, despite a strong public policy of preserving medical
confidences, the cause of action and supporting legal theory deterring
unauthorized disclosure by a physician has been a matter of speculation for many years. "While the law has been so solicitous about the
doctor's duty to keep silent on the witness-stand, it has done little to
protect the patient's medical secrets from disclosure to the world in
general."18
Progress has been made toward recognition of a cause of action
for unauthorized disclosure under theories of breach of statutory duty,
invasion of privacy, libel, malpractice, breach of trust and breach of
contract. 4 The problem is to determine which theories are most sound.
This Comment will examine several possible theories to evaluate their
applicability to an unauthorized disclosure situation in which a data11. The requirements for the application of the privilege in New York are set
forth in a recent case:
(1) The person to testify was authorized to practice medicine or dentistry or
was a registered professional or licensed practical nurse;
(2) The information was acquired while attending the patient in a professional
capacity;
(3) The information was necessary to enable such person to act in that capacity;
(4) The information was intended to be confidential.
Mayer v. Albany Medical Center Hosp., 56 Misc. 2d 239, 241, 288 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773
(Sup. Ct. 1968). See also McCoRmicK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 100, at 215 (2d ed.
1972).
12. The "willful betrayal of a professional secret," alternatively worded as a willful
violation of a confidential or privileged communication, is a ground for revocation of a
physician's license in approximately 23 states.
13. Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing
the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L. J. 607, 616 (1943).
14. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965);
Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb.
224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920); Hauge v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962);
Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Schaffer v.
Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134 (S.D. Sup. Ct. 1974); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331
P.2d 814 (1958); Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917). But see Quarles
v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965). See also Robitscher, Doctor's
Privileged Communications, Public Life History's Rights, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 199
(1968); Note, Extrajudicial Truthful Disclosures of Medical Confidences: A Physician's
Civil Liability, 44 DENVER L.J. 463 (1967); Note, Medical Practice and the Right to
Privacy, 43 MINN. L. REv. 943 (1958) ; Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 1109 (1968).
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system permits access by third parties to identifiable medical information within its "files." In addition, this Comment will propose and
discuss an approach embodying an action based on tortious interference
with contractual performance, which should allow a direct action
against a datasystem in the event of unauthorized disclosure, even
when the datasystem is not within the ambit of the Federal Privacy
Act.15
I. TRADITIONAL CAUSES OF AcTION
A. Breach of a Statutory Duty
A common statutory definition of "unprofessional conduct in medical practice" is the "willful betrayal of a professional secret."' 16 This
definition would presumably encompass an unauthorized disclosure of
medical information.' 7 Therefore, a physician is under a duty to preserve confidentiality. If one accepts the premise that such statutory enactments relating to willful betrayal of profesional secrets were designed
for the protection of a certain class-patients--it follows that a member of that class could bring an action against a disclosing physician.
One problem presented by the use of this particular statutory formulation of unprofessional conduct in the practice of medicine is the meaning of the word "willful." It may be maintained that the use of that
word imports a requirement of bad motive or of a type of "actual
malice."' 8 However, several cases indicate that a demonstration of
actual malice is not required.'9 Another problem is that in many in15. 5 U.S.G.A. § 552a (Supp. 1976). This law is applicable only to datasystems

maintained by federal agencies. Id. § 552(a) (1).
16. ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 257(21)(14) (Supp. 1973); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
NEB. REv. STAT. § 148(8) (1971); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
4731.22(B) (Baldwin 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 12-36(3) (1974); WASH. REv. CODE

§ 2379 (West 1974);

ANN. § 72.030(10) (Supp. 1974). Note the exceptions in the Ohio statute allowing a
physician to disclose to a prospective marital partner or a close relative that an individual
has venereal disease.
17. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965) ; Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973).
18. McPheeters v. Board of Medical Examiners, 103 Cal. App. 297, 284 P. 938
(1930), imports a requirement of wrongful purpose into the word willful. In that case,
the consideration of stripping a physician of his livelihood may have prompted the court
to import such a requirement. This consideration of a permanent bar to practice is not
present in the case of an action for unauthorized disclosure.
19. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 798-99 (N.D.
Ohio 1965) (in which the court considered the problem posed by the McPheeters case
and held that a malice requirement was not imported); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701,
287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (where the court did not consider actual malice necessary for
the application of the statute).
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stances the wording of these statutes relating to a physician's conduct
does not dearly indicate that the intent of the legislature was to protect patients as a class; therefore, the right of a patient to bring a private cause of action for a breach of this statutory duty might be disputed. To avoid this problem it must be argued that since most professional secrets in medicine would relate to a patient, and since the
patient would be the injured party should a physician disclose his
secrets to third parties, the statutes proscribing willful betrayal of
a professional secret were enacted for the protection of the patient.
These two problems (a malice requirement and definition of a class
entitled to an implied right of action under a statute) are avoided in
the New York State regulation which defines unprofessional conduct
in the practice of medicine to include "the revealing of facts, data, or
information obtained in a professional capacity relating to a patient
or his records without first obtaining consent of the patient or his duly
authorized representative, except if duly required by a court of competent jurisdiction or statute ....
'2o This regulation has been recognized as imposing a duty upon the physician to preserve medical confidences.2 1
A similar theory was used in Schaffer v. Spicer,22 a recent South
Dakota Supreme Court case. However, in this case, a testimonial privilege statute rather than an unprofessional conduct statute was used as
a basis for implying a right of action for a breach of statutory duty.
In Schaffer a psychiatrist had furnished an affidavit to a husband concerning his former wife's mental condition. The affidavit was to be
used in a custody proceeding. The wife sued the psychiatrist, who had
treated her, on the theory of breach of a statutory duty. The lower
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and that decision
was reversed by the Supreme Court of South Dakota. Plaintiff's theory
was that South Dakota's testimonial privilege statute23 forbade a phy20. Regulation of the Commissioner of Education, 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 60.1(d) (3),

(1967).
21. Doe v. Roe, 42 App. Div. 2d 559, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560 (ist Dep't), ag'd mem.,.
33 N.Y.2d 902, 307 N.E.2d 823, 352 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1973), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 907
(1974), cert. dismissed, 95 S. Ct. 1154 (1975); Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc. 2d 881,
273 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct., Kings County 1966); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791,.
208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct., Kings County 1960).
22. 215 N.W.2d 134 (S.D. Sup. Ct. 1974). But see Pennison v. Provident Life &.
Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617 (La. Ct. Civ. App. 1963); Curry v. Corn, 52 Misc.
2d 1035, 277 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1966).
23. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-2-3 (1975) reads: "A physician or surgeon,.
or other regular practitioner of the healing art, cannot, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient . .. ."
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sician from testifying in a civil action to medical information obtained
by him in the course of treating his patient, and thereby "impose[d]
a duty.., to keep confidential or privileged information gained while
in professional attendance of a patient." 2 4 The disclosure of medical information-at least with the knowledge that it would be used as evidence in a lawsuit-was a breach of a statutory duty and hence actionable. The court adopted that theory, referring to the case of Smith v.
Driscoll,2 5 in which the same theory had been advanced with limited
acceptance.
Thus, disclosure of medical information by a physician may be
actionable under a breach-of-statutory-duty theory. If, however, the disclosure is not made by a physician but by a datasystem, the problem
arises that there is no generally applicable duty of confidentiality on
the part of the datasystem comparable to the physician's duty of confidentiality.2 6 Thus the breach-of-statutory-duty system fails to provide
a direct action against a datasystem in the event of datasystem disclosure of medical information.
B. Invasion of Privacy
Invasion of privacy would seem to provide such a theory, since
privacy is the primary interest at stake. Yet none of the earlier cases
dealing with unauthorized disclosure of medical information to third
parties framed the action as one for invasion of privacy.27
Unauthorized disclosure of medical information seems to fall
within "disclosure of private facts." 28 In such actions the courts have
generally required that the disclosure be public. 29 Thus, disclosure
to a few people, such as employers, credit managers, social service
workers or other small groups, might not be enough. This factor
may have kept unauthorized disclosure of medical information out
24. 215 N.W.2d at 136.
25. 94 Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917). The implication of a statutory duty of
confidentiality from a testimonial privilege might be seriously questioned on the ground
that the privilege statute is a codification of an exclusionary rule of evidence. In such
a codification the legislature may have intended only that the evidence be excluded
and not that a duty of confidentiality be imposed upon the physician.
26. See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
27. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965)
(action for interference with contractual relations); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791,
208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct., Kings County 1960) (action for malpractice, negligence
and prima facie tort); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920)
(action for breach of a statutory duty). In each of these cases the medical information
at issue was disclosed to a certain person, as opposed to a wide disclosure.
28. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CA~iF. L. lRv. 383, 392-98 (1960).
29. Id. at 393-94.
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of the realm of general privacy law. However, Professor Prosser noted,
"If the record is a confidential one, not open to public inspection...
it is not public, and there can be no doubt that there is an invasion of
privacy." 30 It would seem that when a record has been recognized as
confidential-and medical records have long been so recognized by
physicians and courts3 t-its disclosure should be actionable under some
form of privacy law. Unfortunately, this has not been the case: privacy
law, as developed is not designed to handle the selective dissemination
of confidential information. If courts are now more willing to view a
selective dissemination of confidential medical information as a sufficiently "public" disclosure to allow a cause of action, such a modification might make privacy remedies available in cases of data bank dis32
closure.
In New York, a special problem exists because that state has no
common law of privacy. 3 Thus, any action for invasion of privacy
must be predicated on a statutory right. The principal statutory right
of privacy in New York is conferred by sections 50-51 of the Civil Rights
Law,8 4 which authorize damages and injunctive relief against the use
"for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade [of] the name,
portrait or picture of any living person [without his consent]."' ' Some
30. Id. at 395-96.
31. See note 4 supra.
32. In at least two recent instances courts have used privacy law in cases of unauthorized disclosure. In Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973), the
Supreme Court of Alabama overruled the dismissal of an invasion of privacy count in
an action involving disclosure of medical information to the plaintiff's employer. In
Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974), the
court held that a statute under which a teacher was discharged for immorality was
unconstitutional as applied. There the teacher was discharged when her physician reported to the Board that she had become pregnant and had an abortion while unmarried. The court felt that the conduct in acquiring this information violated her constitutional right of privacy. This Comment will not treat in depth the question of a constitutional right to privacy which applies to disclosure of medical information. The
argument, briefly stated, is that Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), establishes "zones of privacy," one of which is medical information. However, while there
can be a great deal of speculation on how far this privacy-zone characterization could
be carried, there is little indication that this approach will apply to a disclosure of
medical information. Therefore, the utility of the constitutional right of privacy approach may be limited to arguments before courts which accept a broad reading of
Griswold. See Miller, The Right of Privacy: Data Banks and Dossiers, supra note 7,.
at 79-82.
33. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
In this case a girl's picture was used in a poster to advertise flour without her consent.
In its opinion the court ruled that the State of New York recognizes no common law
of privacy, rejecting the approach of Warren and Brandeis. See Warren & Brandeis,.
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
34. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1968).
35. Id. at § 50.
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very early actions brought under this statute concerned medical privacy. In Feeney v. Young, 36 the action centered around a movie showing the plaintiff-patient giving birth to her child, and the court upheld
the mother's cause of action for invasion of privacy. In Griffin v. Medical Society of New York, 37 a medical journal used a patient's nose in
"before" and "after" pictures, and again an invasion of privacy was
recognized. These cases, however, may be distinguished from cases of
disclosure of medical information, because in each an actual picture of
the patient was used, bringing the conduct within the literal words of
the statute: "the name, portrait or picture. '38 In the case of unauthorized disclosure of medical information, no picture or portrait need be
involved (although the name may be used incidentally). Moreover,
these cases seem to fit into the advertising and purposes of trade category, which may not be true in the case of casual datasystem dissemination.
One recent case, Doe v. Roe,39 proceeded under the New York
privacy statute, and involved the unauthorized disclosure of medical
information. In a book entitled In Search of a Response, psychologist
Joan Roe published "an almost verbatim case record ' 40 of a former
patient and her family. Although the names were changed in the book,
the locale and other details remained the same so that the patient was
identifiable. 41 Alleging invasion of privacy, the patient sued the psychologist under the Civil Rights Law, requesting an injunction pendente lite. Special term enjoined all publication aimed at a nonprofessional readership.4 On appeal the appellate division upheld the
lower court, and broadened the relief to enjoin all publication."
Roe indicates a willingness on the part of the courts to apply the
New York privacy statute beyond its literal limits of appropriation of
name, portrait or picture. A sufficient amount of personal information
36. 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (1st Dep't 1920). See also Clayman v.
Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (Phil. Ct. 1940).
37. 7 Misc. 2d 549, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1939).
38. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTs LAw § 50 (McKinney 1968).
39. 42 App. Div. 2d 559, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 33 N.Y.2d
902, 307 N.E.2d 823, 352 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1973), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 907 (1974),
cert. dismissed, 95 S. Ct. 1154 (1975). The lower court opinion was not reported as
per order of the court. It is reproduced in an appendix in Brief for Petitioner, Roe v.

Doe, 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
40. 42 App. Div. 2d at 559, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
41. Id. see Brief for the American Psychiatric Association, American Psychoanalytic Association, American Orthopsychliatric Association, as Amici Curiae at 7, 28-30,

Roe v. Doe, 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
42. 42 App. Div. 2d at 560, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
43. Id., aff'd mem, 33 N.Y.2d 902, 307 N.E.2d 823, 352 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1973).
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may be said to constitute a likeness of a person, which could, in turn,
be equated to a portrait. In the case of Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.,44
a fictionalized biography of the life of Warren Spahn came within the
New York privacy statute although neither Spahn's name nor his picture or portrait, as such, was used in the book. Similarly, a complete
medical history might be considered a "portrait." However, a single
item of information disclosing that a person has cancer or has suffered
from venereal disease may not be sufficient.45 If a data bank were to
disclose such an informational "portrait" for the purposes of trade,
an invasion of privacy action might be directed against the data bank.
This would involve a further problem as to what a disclosure for "purposes of trade" would mean in this situation.
In general, the invasion of privacy action does not provide a viable
action in the case of physician or datasystem disclosure. The requirement of a public disclosure limits the usefulness of the invasion of privacy action in the case of unauthorized disclosure of medical information where the disclosure would be made to only a few people. In New
York, an action against a disclosing datasystem might be brought under
the New York privacy statute, but this would be limited to instances
in which enough information was disseminated to constitute a "portrait," and where the information was used or was to be used for the
purposes of trade.
C. Libel
Since a release of confidential medical information may cause
some damage to the reputation of the patient, an action for libel might
be considered. Certain disclosures, such as the existence of venereal
disease or mental illness, are actionable per se; it is not necessary to
show that the information imparted had actually injured the patient's
reputation.40 One bar to a libel action is that the disclosure must be
false-truth is a complete defense.47 Yet medical information is only
44. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543 (1966).
45. In addition to the amount of information, a distinction may be drawn between different types of information. Psychiatric information, as involved in Doe v. Roe,

has generally been seen as more sensitive and has received greater protection by the
legislature and the judiciary. See N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 15.13c (McKinney
Supp. 1973) which declares psychiatric information in institutions to be strictly confidential; Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County
1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1st Dep't 1945).
46. See PRossER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 112, at 763 (4th ed. 1971); 53 C.J.S.
Libel and Slander §§ 106, 109, 110, 113 (1967), for examples of types of medical
information the false disclosure of which would be libelous per se.
47. See NossER, supra note 46, § 116, at 797.
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valuable in so far as it is accurate, and thus neither a physician nor a
medical datasystem is likely to keep medical information that is false.
However, assuming that a disclosure is made of medical information
that is false, the prospective plaintiff faces another problem in such a
libel action: the disseminator may be afforded a qualified privilege, depending upon his relationship to the person receiving the information.
A qualified communication is "one made bona fide by one who has
an interest in the subject matter to one who has an interest in it or
stands in such a relation that it is a reasonable duty or proper for the
writer to give the information." 48 In a case of disclosure by a datasystem to an employer, the defense of qualified privilege might be applicable; if the patient's medical expenses were covered by a medical
program paid for by the employer, the privilege would certainly exist.
Once this defense is raised, the plaintiff must show bad faith on the
part of the writer. Such bad faith may be shown by actual malice, disclosure with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth. 40 Since
the datasystem's raison d'etre is its ability to provide clients with rapid
access to stores of accurate information, procedures are many times
undertaken to insure the accuracy of the information contained in the
system. Assuming that such procedures were developed in and undertaken by a disclosing datasystem, it would seem that the existence of
such procedures would furnish a defense to a charge that it disclosed
information in reckless disregard of the truth. Because of the limited
scope of libel and the problems surrounding qualified privilege, libel
does not appear to offer a useful cause of action for unauthorized disclosure of medical information by a datasystem.
D. Malpractice
In Clark v. Geraci,5" a court upheld a cause of action for unauthorized disclosure based on a theory of malpractice. This case involved a
civilian Air Force employee who sought a medical excuse for repeated
absences from work. However, instead of certifying that the employee's
absences were due to some medical problem, the physician told the Air
Force that the employee was an alcoholic. The employee sued the physician for malpractice, prima facie tort, and negligence. The court recognized a liability for the disclosure under the first cause of action.
However, since the physician had made incomplete disclosures to the
48. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 87, at 140 (1967).
49. See PROSSER, supra note 46, § 115, at 794-95.
50. 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct., Kings County 1960).

1976]

MEDICAL DATA PRIVACY

Air Force in the past concerning the patient's medical excuses, he could
not be estopped from telling the whole truth, and thus recovery was
denied.r1
Considering unauthorized disclosure by a physician as a form of
malpractice presents a serious theoretical problem. 52 Malpractice is
basically a negligence tort concerning professional competence. However, unauthorized disclosure is intentional conduct. The judgment
of this intentional conduct by negligence standards would cause some
measure of confusion, especially for a jury.
In the case of disclosure by a datasystem, the malpractice approach
would appear to be unavailable unless the datasystem owed a duty of
professional competence to the patient. Even then a cause of action
would only lie for negligent disclosures. Because of these difficulties,
malpractice does not seem to be a workable basis for an unauthorized
disclosure action.
E. Breach of Trust
A significant case in the area of unauthorized disclosure of medical
information by a physician is Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co."3
Plaintiff's hospital bed collapsed, injuring him. The hospital's insurer
also insured the attending physician for malpractice. To obtain confidential medical information concerning the plaintiff, the insurer
falsely told the physician that the plaintiff was preparing to sue him
for malpractice, and that this information was needed to defend the
suit. The physician informed the patient that he would no longer be
treating him and released the information to the insurer. The patient
sued the insurer for interference with contractual relations. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. In the course of denying the defendant's motion, the court
51. Id. at 793, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 567-68.
52. See Hammer v. Polsky, 36 Misc. 2d 482, 233 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County 1962) (holding that disclosure of medical information, though it may constitute unprofessional conduct, is not malpractice); Hannaway v. Cole, 311 N.E.2d 924
(Mass. App. Ct. 1974). Aside from a theoretical problem, characterization of unauthorized disclosure as malpractice could give rise to a practical problem. Present
malpractice insurance rates are soaring and physicians are up in arms. See NEwSwEEK,
June 9, 1975, at 58; TIME, May 5, 1975, at 82. Since the recognition of unauthorized
disclosure as malpractice has met judicial acceptance in only one case-and then probably because the court wanted to recognize a liability for such conduct, and malpractice was the only ground presented under which it could arguably come-a court might
refuse to recognize an action for malpractice stemming from unauthorized disclosure.
A court may view that as an undesirable expansion of the malpractice tort, fearing that
any such expansion would aggravate the present malpractice insurance problem.
53. 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
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suggested that the medical information could be considered as given
to the physician in trust.5 4 The unconsented to disclosure of that information would subject the physician to the liability of a fiduciary.
In a second decision in this case, 5 arising from a motion for summary
judgment, the court reiterated its rationale, stating that the insurer
might be found liable for inducing a breach of trust or interfering
with the duties of a trustee. 56 The breach-of-trust characterization is
based upon the view that medical information in the hands of the
physician is a res given to him in trust:
It is axiomatic that the physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary
one. The policy of the law is to promote a full and free disclosure of
all information by the patient to his treating physician; this information entrusted to the doctor creates a fiduciary responsibility in regard to this information. Those confidences in the trust of a physician are entitled to the same consideration as a res in the control
of a trustee, and the activities of a doctor in regard to those confidences must be subjected to the same close scrutiny as the activities
of a trustee in supervising a res. Consequently this aspect of the
governing
instant case must be appraised in light of the 5principles
7
third party complicity with trustee's misfeasance.
This view enlarges the fiduciary duties of the physician to embrace the
proper safekeeping of medical information. Such an extension seems
warranted.
In the case of a datasystem disclosure, this analysis would work
if the patient had not consented to the entry of the information into
the datasystem. However, the case may arise, such as when information
is submitted to health insurers, in which the patient consented to the
entry of information into the datasystem, but not to the disclosure of
information by the datasystem. In such a case the physician would not
have breached any fiduciary duty. The datasystem, however, might be
subjected to liability by extending the trust analogy one step further
and viewing the datasystem as a trustee of the information, responsible
to the patient when the information is used for purposes other than
those for which it was entrusted to the system. Thus, if information
regarding a patient's treatment for cancer were given to a datasystem
maintained by his hospitalization insurance company, and was dis54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 102.
243 F. Supp. 793 (N-D. Ohio 1965).
Id. at 802.
237 F. Supp. at 102.
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closed to a credit agency, the information would not have been used
as intended. In such a case there could be a breach of fiduciary duty.
The breach of trust action would appear to offer an action against
both the physician and the datasystem for unauthorized disclosure of
medical information. The most significant problem posed by this
theory is the lack of any other judicial support for this approach other
than the two decisions of the Northern District Court of Ohio, both
written by Chief Justice Connell. However, lack of precedent is a
problem with all actions concerning unauthorized disclosure-a relatively unexplored area in the law-and should not pose an insurmountable obstacle in the future.
F. Contract
In addition to the breach of trust view, the federal court in Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 58 also considered a contractual approach
to the problem of unauthorized disclosure. Under a theory of implied
contract, the court found a contractual relationship between the physician and patient, and itrecognized that a disclosure of confidential information could constitute a breach.
Doctor and Patient enter into a simple contract .... As an implied condition of that contract . . . the doctor warrants that any
confidential information gained through the relationship will not be
released without the patient's permission.59
The finding of a contract was based on the representations of the physician that he would not betray the patient's confidences. These representations were not made explicitly, but were inferred from the Hippocratic Oath and the Physician's Code of Ethics. 0 Reliance upon these
implied promises of confidentiality could be justified by the fact that
the physician would be subject to revocation of his license for unauthorized disclosure.6 1 Additional support for this inference of a contract, as well as for the finding of a trust, was found in Alexander v.
Knight,62 a negligence action resulting from an automobile accident.
It came to the court's attention that a physician had obtained a medical
58. 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
59. Id. at 801.
60. See note 14 supra & accompanying text.
61. 243 F. Supp. at 797, 801; see note 12 supra & accompanying text.
62. 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 649, 655 (Phil. Ct. 1961); see 243 F. Supp. at 799. See also
Hauge v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962); Clayman v. Bernstein,
38 Pa. D & C.543, 549 (Phil. Ct. 1940).
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report on behalf of the defendant from the plaintiff's physician without
plaintiff's consent. The court went out of its way to comment that:
We are of the opinion that members of a profession, especially the
medical profession, stand in a confidential or fiduciary capacity to
their patients. They owe their patients more than just medical care
for which payment is exacted; there is a duty of total care; that
includes and comprehends a duty to aid the patient in litigation,
to render reports when necessary and attend court when needed.
That further includes a duty to refuse affirmative assistance to the
patient's antagonist in litigation. The doctor, of course, owes a duty
to speak the truth; he need, however, speak only at the proper time.
Dr. Ezickson's role in inducing Dr. Murtaugh's breach of his confidential relationship to his own patient is to be, and is, condemmed.0 3
Yet the court would not go so far as to recognize an absolute liability
for extrajudicial disclosures. It only recognized a liability when this
conduct was not outweighed by some public goal served by disclosure. 4
The court thus required that the public policy toward encouraging the
confidentiality of medical information, as embodied in the testimonial
privilege and the unprofessional conduct statutes, be weighed against
the public interest in the disclosure. Since the theory behind implying
a contract does rest on public policy, this type of balancing would be
inevitable in the contract approach. The contract approach at least
clearly defines the competing concerns to be considered.
An advantage of this approach is its relative simplicity; public
policy and the physician's voluntary commitment to ethical standards
establish a duty of the doctor and a promise upon which the patient
relies. 5 This duty becomes a contiact, and when the physician does
disclose medical secrets there is a breach. There is little legal manipulation required once the premise of a duty not to disclose is accepted.
Since the physician's ethical duty has been so prominently expressed
through medical ethics in general, it is not hard to conclude that a
promise has been made to the patient that medical information will be
kept confidential.
Two recent decisions have characterized the physician-patient relationship as contractual with respect to the confidentiality of medical
information, and have thus lent support to the Hammonds rationale.
63. 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 649, 655 (Phil. Ct. 1961).
64. 243 F. Supp. at 800-01.
65. One flaw that must be noted is the extent to which the patient "relies" on
the promise of confidentiality. In the case of psychiatric treatment, there may indeed
be reliance. In the case of a heart attack, it is doubtful the patient is really concerned
with confidentiality at that point. Courts have invariably overlooked this legal fiction.
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The lower court's opinion in Doe v. Roe 6 employed a contractual approach in part: "Here the defendants obtained information from the
plaintiff under the implied, if not express, agreement that confidences
would be respected and indeed the express understanding that disclosure to the defendant was necessary in order for the defendant to
perform the professional services for which defendant had been retained."8 7 A second recent case is that of Home v. Patton.8 In that case
the defendant, Dr. Patton, disclosed medical information to the plaintiff's employer. In addition to alleging invasion of privacy and breach
of statutory duty, the plaintiff included a count of breach of contract.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to this complaint, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed and upheld all counts as stating triable
causes of action. In finding that the complaint stated a valid cause of
action in contract against the disclosing physician, the court recognized
the implied promise of the physician to keep medical information confidential, as expressed through ethical codes, as one justifying the patient's reliance:
We have not been cited to, nor have we found in our research any
case in which a cause of action for the breach of an implied contract
of confidentiality on the part of the doctor has been rejected. Moreover, public knowledge of the ethical standards of the medical profession or widespread acquaintance with the Hippocratic Oath's secresy provision or the AMA Principles of Ethics or Alabama's medical licensing requirement... singly or together may well be sufficient
justification for the reasonable expectation on the patient's part that
the physician has promised to keep confidential all information given
by the patient.69
These cases show some judicial acceptance of the premise of a physician's contractual duty not to disclose. Since it is somewhat unlikely
that a physician would disclaim this implied duty as it is also an ethical
precept, it may be concluded that there is a general contract of confidentiality binding the physician. Thus the physician who discloses
medical information may be sued for breach of contract. More importantly, since the physician's liability might otherwise be established
under a breach-of-statutory-duty theory, the finding of a contract provides a basis for a proceeding against a disclosing datasystem on the
66. 42 App. Div. 2d 559, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1st Dep't 1973); see notes 38-45
supra & accompanying text.
67. Brief for Petitioner at 4a, Roe v. Doe, 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
68. 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973).
69. Id. at 711, 287 So. 2d at 832.
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ground that it has interfered with the performance of the physician's
contract of confidentiality. Since the patient has suffered by this interference-in that a contract of confidentiality between doctor and
patient is made less valuable if this confidential information can be
obtained through another source-the patient appears to be a proper
plaintiff. The feasibility of pursuing an action against a datasystem,
based upon this interference with contractual performance theory, will
be discussed below.
II.

CONTRACTUAL

INTERFERENCE AS A CAUSE OF ACTION

AGAINST A DATASYSTEM

There are several different torts within the general heading of
contractual interference, including induction of breach of contract,
interference with performance of contract, interference with prospective business advantage and interference with business relations. The
first might be applicable when a physician is actually induced to release
information to a datasystem absent patient consent. While such conduct might occur in some instances, it should be recognized that such
an action focuses on the disclosure by the physician to the datasystem
rather than the disclosure by the datasystem to a third party. It may
well be that the latter disclosure is the one that is really'objectionable.
In many cases, the physician's disclosure to a datasystem may have been
authorized by the patient so that his medical expenses can be reimbursed, or better health care attained. In this case, a breach of the contract of confidentiality has not been induced. It might be maintained
that the subsequent disclosure by the datasystem has made the contract
of confidentiality less valuable to the patient. Under such conditions,
the tort of interference with contractual performance might be available to afford the patient a direct action against a datasystem. This tort
action will be treated as the one generally applicable in the case of a
datasystem disclosure of medical information.
The use of a contractual interference tort action against a third
party in the case of medical information disclosure is not completely
unprecedented. In Hammondse° such an action was brought and upheld. However, in that case, the action is probably better characterized
as one for induction of breach of contract rather than for interference
with contractual performance-at least in the sense of interference with
70.

237 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ohio 1965); 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
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the contract of confidentiality. Thus the use of the interference-withcontractual-performance action as a means of pursuing a direct action
against a datasystem is somewhat novel.
An objection may be made to this approach on the ground that
it would constitute a significant departure from cases in which the
interference-with-contractual-performance tort has been used.71 In both
De-Jur Amsco Corp. v. Janrus Camera, Inc. and Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Record Corp.7 3 the tort was used in cases involving an interference with exclusive marketing rights. This type of
situation is roughly analogous to the datasystem situation in that the
understanding of the physician and the patient would be that the
patient, through his consent, and the physician, within the bounds
proscribed by ethics and law, would have the exclusive right to determine who would be allowed to receive confidential medical information. At the least, the datasystem's independent exercise of rights to
release medical information is not contemplated here, and any such
release would be interference with the physician's and patient's exclusive rights regarding any such release. However, beyond this analogy,
there are no other similar instances in which the tort of interference
with contractual relations has been used. Therefore, an objection that
this approach is unfounded should be considered seriously. However,
as demonstrated in earlier sections of this Comment, when faced with
cases of physician disclosures courts have borrowed legal doctrines
traditionally applicable in other areas of the law and applied them
to cases of disclosure of medical information. In the case of an action
against a datasystem under the interference-with-performance theory,
courts may expand this tort action in similar fashion so as to serve the
public policy of preserving medical confidences.
The basic elements of interference with contractual performance
appear to be identical to those of induction of breach, provided that it
is shown that the value of the contract has been diminished by the
interference or that performance has been made more burdensome or
impossible. The three requisites are existence of a contract, defendant's
knowledge of the contract, and an appropriate type of intent.7 4
71.

See Carpenter, Interference with Contractual Relations, 41 HAnv. L. Rv.

728, 732 (1928).
72. 16 Misc. 2d 772, 155 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1956).
73. 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1950), aff'd, 279
App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951).
74. See generally Carpenter, supra note 71; PROSSER, supra note 46, §§ 129-30;
32 N.Y. JUR. Interference (1963).
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A. Existence of a Contract
A bona fide contract is necessary for an action for contractual
interference. However, defects such as lack of mutuality, consideration,
or violation of the Statute of Frauds, will not affect liability for contractual interference.1 5 A successful action may be based upon a contract
which is voidable for such defects.
There would be few cases, if any, of an express contract between the
physician and patient, therefore any contract must be implied. 0 But
the absence of an express contract should pose no problem since there
is a basis from which to infer an implied contract of confidentiality
between the physician and patient.1 7 Thus, there is a contract of confidentiality.
A problem arises, however, when a doctor's services are rendered
gratis. In Quarles v. Sutherland 8 a woman became ill in a store and
the store's physician attended her. When he subsequently disclosed
medical information concerning her to a third party, the court held
that there was no cause of action. In such a case is there a contract of
confidentiality? It is submitted that such a contract exists and that its
existence depends on the specific professional capacity in which the
client is being served rather than upon the source of payment for such
services. Consider an attorney's duty to protect the confidences of his
client.1 9 In the case of an indigent defendant represented by the state
no one would consider the duty of confidentiality to be determined by
the source of payment. Similarly, both the patient and the defendant
are accorded the protection of testimonial privilege to prevent the
physician or attorney from being compelled to divulge professional
confidences.80 In neither case does the application of the evidentiary
privilege rest on any consideration of the source of payment. Furthermore, the contract of confidentiality rests partly on the reasonable reliance of the patient that the medical community will keep medical
information confidential. 81 Since the physician's ethics do not change
when services are rendered gratis, neither should the contractual obligation of confidentiality.
75.

PROSSER, supra note 46, at 931.
76. In the psychiatric field, an express contract might arise from the assurance

given to a patient that anything divulged to the psychiatrist will be kept secret, assuming that the patient would not have entered treatment absent such an assurance.
77. See notes 58-69 supra & accompanying text.
78. 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965).
79. ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1974).
80. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. P nc. LAW §§ 4503, 4504 (McKinney 1968).
81. See note 69 supra & accompanying text.
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B. Knowledge of Contract
The defendant must know of the existence of a contract before
his conduct in interfering with its performance or inducing its breach
can be held actionable.Y But this knowledge need only include a
general notion of its terms; detailed knowledge of the contract is not
required to render an interference actionable: "We do not agree with
these appellants that they must have full knowledge of the detailed
terms of the existing contract between Rutland and Gold Medal, and
we find nothing in the authorities cited by these appellants that so
holds."8 13 In the case of a datasystem, such knowledge would seem to
exist. Since the public knowledge of the Hippocratic Oath and medical
ethics relating to the physician-patient confidence has become sufficient
to justify reliance on those ethical promises, it would seem that the proprietor of a datasystem dealing in medical information should be
charged with knowledge of these promises and, hence, the contract.
C. Intent
Originally, actual ill-will was required for an action for contractual interference.
The early cases, with their emphasis upon "malice," regarded proof
of an improper motive as an essential part of the plaintiff's cause of
action. As the tort became more firmly established, there was a gradual shift of emphasis, until today it is generally agreed that an intentional interference with the existing contractual relations of another
is prima facie sufficient for liability, and that
the burden of proving
84
that it is "justified" rests upon the defendant.
Although malice is still a necessary element in several jurisdictions it
is defined not as a feeling of ill-will but as the intentional and unjustified doing of a wrongful act.8 5 Thus the question becomes one of
82. See, e.g., Comtrol, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 32 Colo. App.
384, 387, 513 P.2d 1082, 1084 (1973); Northern Ins. Co. v. Doctor, 23 Il1. App. 2d
225, 228, 161 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1st Div. 1959); Horn v. Seth, 201 Md. 589, 593, 95
A.2d 312, 314 (1953); Kenworthy v. Kleinberg, 182 Wash. 425, 430, 47 P.2d 825, 827
(1935). See also PROSSER, supra note 46, at 941; 32 N.Y. JUR. Interference § 23
(1963).
83. Gold Medal Farms, Inc. v. Rutland County Co-Operative Creamery, Inc.,
9 App. Div. 2d 447, 478-79, 195 N.Y.S.2d 179, 185 (3d Dep't 1959), modified, 10 App.
Div. 2d 584, 195 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dep't 1960).
84. PROSStR, supra note 46, § 129, at 942; see Morris v. Blume, 55 N.Y.S.2d 196
Sup. Ct., N.Y. County), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 832, 56 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dep't 1945);
Carpenter, supra note 71, at 734-35.
85. See, e.g., Birmingham Broadcasting Co. v. Bell, 259 Ala. 656, 664, 68 So. 2d
314, 322 (1953); Symon v. J. Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 1971);
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justification. In an early article dealing with the tort of contractual interference, Professor Carpenter set forth several categories of justifications:6
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Privilege to protect contract rights or property rights.
Privilege to interfere to protect life, reputation or health.
Privilege to give disinterested advice.
Privilege to discipline, to appeal to authorities for redress,
to act in performance of duty.
(5) Privilege not to deal.
(6) Privilege of competition.
Another, more general justification is "a disinterested motive of a
laudable character."8 7 This justification suggests a competing social,
rather than economic, concern.
With respect to an action against a datasystem for interference
with contractual performance by disclosing information without consent, one possible justification is that the defendant datasystem is bound
to disclose by a prior contract giving it equal or superior rights vis-avis the rights of the patient under the contract of confidentiality. To
illustrate, suppose a physician submits medical information (in the
form of a claim for reimbursement) to a datasystem maintained by
a health care insurer. Further, suppose that the insurer had entered
into a contract to provide this information to life insurers.88 The contractual rights of the life insurers are equal to those of the patient, and
under the justification for interference in the case of equal or superior
rights, this interference would be justified. Therefore, no action for
contractual interference would lie. However, if the contractual rights
of a third party to receive medical information from a datasystem involved a fairly substantial abrogation of confidentiality, it might be
argued that such a contract would be void as against public policy, and
that rights under this contract should not justify an interference with
the contract of confidentiality.8 9 Since the regulations and statutes
Grammenos v. Zolotas, 356 Mass. 594, 597, 254 N.E.2d 789, 791 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 363 Mo. 852, 858, 253 S.W.2d 976, 980
(1953); Raymond v. Cregar, 38 N.J. 472, 480, 185 A.2d 856, 860 (1962); Reichman
v. Drake, 89 Ohio App. 222, 228, 100 N.E.2d 533, 536-37 (Ct. App. 1951).
86. Carpenter, supra note 71, at 745-62.
87. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 129, at 943-44.
88. A contract to provide information is to be distinguished from informationsharing on an informal level, such as through the "buddy system."
89. While a void contract might suffice to provide a basis for an action for contractual interference, it does not follow that it should be used as a basis to defeat such
an action.
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governing unprofessional conduct and testimonial privilege indicate a
legislative purpose of preserving confidentiality, a contract to abrogate
this confidentiality on a large scale basis might therefore be void as
against public policy.90
A disclosure that a person was suffering from a contagious disease
poses the question of whether this might be justified under a general
notion of "public good," or as an instance in which interference is
justified by exercise of a privilege to protect life, reputation and health.
In Legris v. Marcotte,91 the defendant told the administration of a
boarding school in which her children were students that the children
of Mrs. Marcotte had been exposed to a contagious disease. Thereupon
the school administration delayed the admission of the Marcotte children to the school. Mrs. Marcotte sued on behalf of her children for interference with contractual rights. The court found the motive for such
intereference was justifiable in that the defendant could rightfully interfere with plaintiff's contractual rights when the health of her own
children was at stake. While this case did not concern a provable disclosure of medical information by a physician, it indicates that a court
might perceive that an interference with the patient's contractual right
of confidentiality through unauthorized disclosure is justified if made
in response to a threat to health.
Presumably, a data-bank dissemination of medical information
pursuant to a duty imposed by a statute or regulation requiring such
a dissemination would also be justified. Federal, state and local governments might require that certain health data be given to them, as
in the case of information required from health care providers under
90. The MIB (Medical Information Bureau) is a massive datasystem which
contains information on approximately 12 million Americans. This datasystem functions
as a means for life insurers to warn each other of applicants who have been denied life
insurance coverage for failing to meet the applicable medical standards. In this system,
the applicant for life insurance consents to the entry of the results of his physical examination into the system. Thus no breach of the physician's contract of confidentiality
is involved. Since the MIB has fully disclosed its intentions and required the applicant
to waive confidentiality, it bypasses the problem of breach of medical confidence. As
such, the MIB is permitted to have a contract of large scale disclosure of medical information that would not be void as against the public policy of confidentiality since
the disclosure of this information is the sole reason for the physician-patient interaction
in this case. See Pascoe, MIB: It Has 12 Million Americans at Its Fingertips, 2 PsSM
28 (June 1974); Stem, Medical Information Bureau: The Life Insurer's Databank,
4 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & LAW 1 (1974). This, however, does point out the weakness of using common law remedies to insure confidentiality. While both the datasystem and individual may be equal in the eyes of the law, the economic power of the
datasystem's proprietor may force the individual to waive his right to confidentiality
in return for life insurance, a job, credit, medical care reimbursement, and college admission.
91. 129 Ill. App. 67 (1906). See also Carpenter, supra note 74, at 748.
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the Medicare Act.0 A legally imposed duty to disclose medical information would furnish such a justification. 93 This suggests the need for an
integrated policy of governmental demands for identifiable medical
information with regard given to the policies of confidentiality in
medical information and with safeguards implemented so that information which is forwarded to governmental entities will remain confidential.
D. Remedies
Injunctive relief is recognized as an appropriate remedy in an
action for contractual interference.9 4 The availability of injunctive
relief is significant in that this remedy is the primary goal of the plaintiff who wishes to preserve his privacy by preventing disclosure of his
medical information. It is also significant that an emerging view is to
allow intentional tort damages 9 5-- including mental suffering, damage
to reputation and punitive damages--in an action for contractual interference. This is encouraging to a plaintiff in that a substantial recovery might be obtained even where he cannot show any substantial
amount of actual pecuniary damage. Since the plaintiff, in the case
where he challenges datasystem dissemination, is likely to encounter
a protracted legal fight, the availability of a substantial recovery is
necessary so that he may recoup his legal expenses.
CONCLUSION

One conclusion that may be drawn from several recent cases of
unauthorized disclosure of medical information is that the right to
privacy in one's medical information has received greater recognition
than heretofore. Several courts have allowed claims based on unauthorized disclosure of medical information to third parties. The problem is that the scope of that right to privacy-especially when compared to possible public interests in the disclosure of medical information-is uncertain. This uncertainty in that scope inhibits aggrieved
parties from bringing legal actions. Case-by-case development of a right
to confidentiality in medical information cannot be relied upon to
92.
Records
REV. 37,
93.
94.
95.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (1970). See also Boyer, Computerized Medical
and the Right to Privacy: The Emerging Federal Response, 25 BUFFALO L.
61-74 (1975).
See text accompanying note 86 supra.
See, e.g., Morris v. Blume, 55 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
See PROSSER, supra note 46, § 129, at 948-49.
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provide a firmly entrenched cause of action for unauthorized disclosure.
It is suggested that the duty of a physician to preserve his patient's
medical confidences is contractual, and that such a characterization will
yield a cause of action against unauthorized disclosure without unduly
straining the underlying legal doctrines. It further appears that the
tort of interference with contractual performance would then yield an
effective remedy against a datasystem proprietor if identifiable medical
information were intentionally disseminated and assuming there was
no express agreement allowing the dissemination. However, assuming
that there is a right not to have identifiable medical information disclosed absent consent, the major problem is the determination of the
scope of that right. There are two methods by which this scope could
be delineated. One is judicial interpretation; the other, legislative
action. Judicial interpretation through the case-by-case method is
-very slow. Even though cases involving unauthorized disclosure appear
more and more often, they are still infrequent, and each of them has
involved a substantially different factual setting. Thus, on a case-bycase approach, the law of unauthorized disclosure of medical informadon could remain uncertain for years to come at a time when significant advances in the state of the art of computers may be expected.
Such advances suggest the prospect of an increasing dissemination of
medical confidences by private datasystems which are not within the
ambit of present regulation. In addition, the balancing of competing
interests in privacy and other societal goals involves an evaluation
of public policy that is better reserved for the legislature.
A legislative pronouncement of the rights of the individual with
respect to medical information should be articulated. The first step
in such legislation would be to firmly establish the right to medical
confidentiality. This should end uncertainty as to whether unauthorized disclosure of medical information to third parties is actionable,
regardless of whether a physician, datasystem or datasystem employee
is engaged in the disclosure. This definition of the basic right to confidentiality of medical information should make it clear that the duty
of confidentiality is not limited to data-banks, but applies to all health
care professionals, hospitals and other information systems within legislative jurisdiction. In formulating such a provision, legislatures would
be well advised to avoid any preemption of common law remedies 6
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970); see A. R. MILLER, supra note 7, at 102. This preemption of the right to sue in the Act may well have been a great benefit to the credit
agencies that the Act was designed to regulate, at the expense of the consumer public
which was the object of the Act's protection.
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The second step in enacting a law defining the right to privacy of
medical information, and providing for regulation of datasystems dealing with medical information, requires that a legislature address the
issue of when, if ever, a datasystem may disclose medical information.
This would embrace the area of justifications, and' involve consideration of the theories suggested by the various courts which have recognized disclosures as actionable but failed to find liability. 97 If a right
to confidentiality in medical information is provided for by legislation,
but justifications for the release of medical information in certain circumstances are not, courts might develop areas of justification, and thus
limit the formulation of a unified policy regarding confidentiality of
medical information. Since the right of privacy has not been established
as absolute, it is conceivable that a court might recognize circumstances.
which would require disclosure of medical information. Instances in
which medical information might be justifiably disclosed should be
considered by the legislature. Certain public interests may sufficiently
weigh against the interests of privacy to warrant disclosure.
Where the patient has given his informed consent 8 to a disclosure
of medical information, the disclosure would not be unauthorized and
thus would not be objectionable. A problem arises, however, in the
case in which an insurer or reimburser for medical services demands
medical information before a claim will be paid. In such a case, thepatient may be compelled to waive his right to confidentiality, but
there may be no need for the party requesting medical information to
receive all information pertaining to a patient. A useful component
of a provision relating to the release of information upon consent
would be one limiting the amount of information given to a party
when the patient has executed a waiver under a contractual obligation
to do so, to that which is reasonably necessary to that party. 99
Another circumstance in which a breach of confidentiality may be
97. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 800-01 (N.D_
Ohio 1965); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 228-29, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920);
Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 793, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68 (Sup. Ct., Kings
County 1960); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 196-97, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (1958);
Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 443, 162 P. 572, 573 (1917).
98. This, however, raises the problem of informed consent over which there has
been a great deal of litigation and judicial interpretation.
99. Another problem that arises is the right of a person to see his own medical
records. While the patient is the one most directly concerned with his medical infor-

mation, there is a great reluctance to allow the patient to see his medical record,
stemming, in part, from fears that "bad news" might retard prospects for patient recovery. This problem is treated in depth in Kaiser, Patients' Rights of Access to Their
Own Medical Records, 24 BuFFALo L. REv. 317 (1975), wherein the author presents
cogent reasons for allowing a patient to have access to his own medical records.
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justified is when an individual's own medical information is needed
to give him prompt, effective treatment, and when consent is either
impossible or impractical to obtain. In such a case the information
should be disseminated to medical personnel, and the danger to privacy
would be no greater than that encountered- when medical personnel
routinely use identifiable medical informaton for the purposes of
treatment and diagnosis. Indeed, it is primarily for this purpose that
medical records are kept. When information is needed to render
prompt care it should be disclosed, so long as immediate care appears
reasonably necessary. It is in the case of a disclosure of medical information that is not for the purposes of the patient's treatment that the
concern over the patient's privacy arises. It should be made clear in
any legislation regulating disclosure of medical information that disclosure under certain conditions such as these would be proper.
When there is a substantial threat to the life or health of a person
other than the person whose medical ifnformation is involved, individual privacy may yield to the well-being of other people. One example of such a situation is the case of a person who is suffering from
a contagious disease. 100 The scope of disclosure justified under a "threat
to the health of others" exception might be limited by a provision
stating that the disclosure would be allowable only in cases where a
quarantine would be required, or when a reporting statute required
disclosure. A second, more difficult case would be encountered if it
became apparent from examining a medical record that a railroad engineer, bus driver, or even an air controller, was suffering from chronic
alcoholism (or some other ailment) to the extent that he constituted
a danger to others when on the job.'0 ' Assuming that legislation regulating medical-information release provided a justification allowing
release to avoid a substantial danger to the life or health of third parties, this situation would require an interpretation of "substantial danger to life or health." Such an interpretation should include an examination of the seriousness and advanced condition of the particular
ailment, and the likelihood and seriousness of mishap.
It is conceivable that circumstances might arise in which a law enforcement agency would feel that access to medical information pertaining to a fugitive, particularly psychiatric information, would be of
assistance in apprehending a fugitive. Law enforcement agencies might
100. This was the situation in Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W.
831 (1920), with the exception that medical science has shown that venereal disease is
not quite as contagious as once believed.
101. See Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Ga. 1957).
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suggest that release to them of identifiable medical information -should
be justified in certain cases. Such a justification poses a significant
qiestion of balancing the rights to privacy of a person accused but not
necessarily convicted of a crime, with the interests of society in efficient
law enforcement and safety. One suggestion is that the unauthorized
release of identifiable medical information from a datasystem to law
enforcement agencies is justified when made pursuant to a court order
based upon a 'showing that the type of information sought will substantially aid in the apprehension of a dangerous fugitive.1 02 Such a justification is objectionable in the case of a fugitive who has not been convicted of a crime. He would be deprived of a right to confidentiality
in medical information without a showing that he had in fact committed a crime. It may be argued that there is an insufficient basis in
such a case on which to maintain that the fugitive is dangerous. And
even in the case of a fugitive who has been convicted of a violent crime
and who has escaped, it might be argued that the penalty for the crime
is only the sentence to be imposed, and not an additional loss of privacy.
On the other hand, the apprehension of a fugitive may involve a
great deal of manpower and expense. In addition, a "dangerous" fugitive may be characterized as a threat to the health and safety of the
public. If the release of medical information pertaining to a dangerous
fugitive may significantly diminish that threat and reduce the expense
and possibly make apprehension easier and safer for the persons involved, it may be argued that the privacy rights of a fugitive should
not prevail. Privacy in medical information has not been recognized
as absolute in the past, and a deprivation of privacy rights is sometimes
justified when the public good demands it. Furthermore, in the case
of the unconvicted fugitive, the speedy apprehension of the fugitive
would promote the goal of a speedy trial.
To minimize the loss of privacy, any release of medical information 'should be made on the condition that such information is to be
used only for law enforcement purposes and is not to be disclosed to
outside parties, particularly the news media. Such a restriction might
diminish the loss of privacy incident to such an information disclosure
and afford some protection against a wide public dissemination of very
personal information. Release in such a case may be justified on the
ground that the right to privacy is subservient to a compelling public
102. This standard also raises the question of the extent to which judicial invcstigation is necessary in order to allow such a disclosure.
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interest. 0 3 The requirement that disclosure must substantially aid in
the apprehension of a dangerous fugitive acts as a safeguard to insure
that the public interest was compelling. Under such conditions, the
release of medical information would seem at least consistent with the
justification for release in the case of substantial danger to the life or
health of others.
After the formulation of an act establishing rights of confidentiality in medical information, the question will arise whether an administrative agency should be established to enforce rights secured
under the act. Such an approach would offer flexibility but would increase bureaucracy. An agency could assist in detecting unauthorized
disclosures through checking or auditing procedures, and could also
interpret general standards contained in the act. Such an agency might
possess expertise not within the province of the legislature. In lieu of
charging an administrative body with these functions, a more detailed
bill might be drafted. However, a detailed bill may require the legislature to engage in a laborious and speculative attempt at anticipating
various disclosure situations.
In the area of privacy and computers there are problems other
than unauthorized disclosure. These problems include security requirements, qualifications of personnel handling sensitive information,
and datasystem liability for negligent loss of privacy through inadequate security. Because of the seriousness of such problems, even if an
administrative agency limited to monitoring unauthorized disclosure
of medical information is not presently on the agenda, the future
probably holds the establishment of administrative agencies dealing
with the broad issue of the relationship of privacy and datasystems. It is
suggested that, irrespective of the merits of an administrative approach
to the problems of privacy in the area of medical information, legislative clarification of the right to privacy in this area should be presently undertaken so that technological development does not outstrip
legal development.
JOHN
103. See note 97 supra & accompanying text.
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